Insider Threat Post-Layoff Scenario
Scenario Overview
Exercise Type: Technical Simulation Tabletop Exercise Target Audience: SOC Analysts, IT Security Teams, Network Engineers, HR Business Partners Scenario: Malicious Insider Compromise Following Workforce Reduction Duration: 120-150 minutes Exercise Objective: Validate response capabilities to privileged account abuse and systemic infrastructure sabotage
Facilitator Guidelines
- Emphasize coordination between HR and security teams
- Focus on Active Directory recovery procedures and DNS forensic analysis
- Track evidence preservation requirements
- Simulate real-time pressure with escalating injects
Exercise Script
INJECT 1: Initial Access Issues (Day 1 - 08:45 AM)
Situation:
- Help desk receives 127 tickets within first hour of operations:
- Users report "The trust relationship between this workstation and the primary domain failed" errors
- Multiple domain-joined Linux servers failing SSH key authentication
- Azure AD hybrid join status showing "Needs Attention" for 43% of devices
Facilitator Notes:
- Observe initial triage procedures
- Note discussions about credential churn vs. infrastructure sabotage
DISCUSSION PROMPT: "What diagnostic steps would you take? How prioritize between user impact vs. security investigation?"
INJECT 2: Authentication Failure Analysis (Day 1 - 10:15 AM)
Situation:
- Security team findings:
- Domain controllers rejecting valid Kerberos tickets (error 0x6FB)
- Wireshark captures show NTLM fallback attempts being blocked
- Event ID 4769 (Kerberos service ticket operations) spiking by 1400%
- HR provides list of 87 employees terminated during layoffs
Facilitator Notes:
- Evaluate understanding of Kerberos authentication chain
- Note discussions about golden ticket detection
DISCUSSION PROMPT: "What forensic artifacts would you collect from domain controllers? How validate genuine vs. spoofed authentication attempts?"
INJECT 3: EDR Policy Tampering (Day 1 - 1:30 PM)
Situation:
- CrowdStrike Falcon console audit reveals:
- All prevention policies disabled at 2025-04-25T17:32:00Z (Friday post-layoffs)
- Modification trace:
- User: mickey_mouse@internal
- Source IP: 10.5.16.22 (Terminated sysadmin's workstation)
- Network logs show:
- Sustained RDP connections to Domain Controller from 10.5.16.22
- DNS AXFR requests to non-authoritative nameservers
Facilitator Notes:
- Assess chain of custody procedures for terminated employee devices
- Note discussions about policy enforcement bypass techniques
DISCUSSION PROUT: "How would you safely re-enable EDR controls? What safeguards prevent policy tampering recurrence?"
INJECT 4: Domain Controller Compromise (Day 1 - 3:00 PM)
Situation:
- DC forensic analysis reveals:
- LMHosts file modification redirecting LDAP traffic to 127.0.0.1
- New hidden admin account:
- Username: Mickey_Mouse
- SID: S-1-5-21-3623811015-3361044348-30300820-500
- Last logon: 2025-04-25T17:45:00Z
- Security team identifies:
- 14 new GPOs pushing malicious registry edits
- DFS replication to rogue server at 192.168.5.33
Facilitator Notes:
- Evaluate AD forest recovery strategies
- Note discussions about system hardening baseline verification
DISCUSSION PROMPT: "What immediate containment steps for compromised DCs? How verify GPO integrity across the enterprise?"
INJECT 5: Credential Harvesting Evidence (Day 2 - 9:00 AM)
Situation:
- Memory forensics on terminated workstation reveals:
- Mimikatz residues with DC sync commands
- 28,456 harvested credentials in plaintext
- Scheduled task calling:
powershell -ep bypass -c "Invoke-MassCredentials -Target OU=Finance"
- HR identifies Mickey_Mouse account matches terminated employee's pet name
Facilitator Notes:
- Highlight need for privileged access management controls
- Note discussions about credential lifecycle management
DISCUSSION PROMPT: "What credential rotation strategy would you implement? How handle service account dependencies?"
INJECT 6: DNS Infrastructure Sabotage (Day 2 - 1:45 PM)
Situation:
- Network team reports:
- Authoritative DNS servers returning NXDOMAIN for internal zones
- External DNS resolution redirected to 104.18.25.93 (malicious comedy site)
- DNSSEC validation failures across all recursive resolvers
- Packet captures show:
- TSIG key abuse for zone transfers
- Dynamic updates deleting A/AAAA records
Facilitator Notes:
- Evaluate DNS forensic investigation techniques
- Note discussions about DNSSEC rollover procedures
DISCUSSION PROMPT: "How would you rebuild DNS infrastructure? What validation steps ensure resolution integrity?"
INJECT 7: Post-Recovery Validation (Day 5 - 10:00 AM)
Situation:
- Current state:
- 100% credential rotation completed
- New isolated domain forest deployed
- 93% systems migrated to clean environment
- Remaining issues:
- Legacy HVAC system still authenticating to old domain
- 14 IoT devices with hardcoded DNS to malicious IP
- Pending HR litigation over privacy violations
Facilitator Notes:
- Focus on business continuity vs. security tradeoffs
- Note discussions about IoT security policies
DISCUSSION PROMPT: "What metrics define recovery completion? How prevent similar insider sabotage?"
Exercise Debrief
Technical Focus Areas:
- Active Directory Forest Recovery
- DNS Infrastructure Hardening
- Privileged Access Workflow Review
- Termination Procedures Automation
- Defense-in-Depth Against Insider Threats
After-Action Deliverables:
- Privileged session monitoring implementation plan
- Dynamic DNS update authentication controls
- Layoff-specific security playbook
- Mandatory vacation policy for sysadmins
Next Steps:
- Conduct purple team exercise testing termination procedures
- Implement FIDO2 hardware tokens for admin access
- Schedule quarterly insider threat simulation drills
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