Software Supply Chain Compromise Scenario
Scenario Overview
Exercise Type: Technical Simulation Tabletop Exercise Target Audience: DevOps Teams, Application Security Engineers, Incident Responders, Global IT Leadership Scenario: Cascading Third-Party Library Vulnerabilities Leading to System Compromise Duration: 180-210 minutes Exercise Objective: Validate cross-functional response to weaponized NPM dependencies and associated infrastructure impacts
Facilitator Guidelines
- Emphasize software bill of materials (SBOM) analysis
- Highlight coordination challenges in global organizations
- Track technical debt vs. security prioritization debates
- Simulate real-time pressure with concurrent crises
Exercise Script
INJECT 1: Critical Vulnerability Alert (Day 1 - 08:00 AM)
Situation:
- Dependency scanning tools alert on:
[email protected]
(EOL) with CVE-2024-32794 (CVSS 10.0)- Exploit POC available on GitHub demonstrating RCE via malformed props
- Security audit reveals:
- 142 production microservices using vulnerable version
- Library maintainer declares bankruptcy - no patches forthcoming
Facilitator Notes:
- Observe discussions about legacy system risks
- Note debates between hotfixing vs. architecture changes
DISCUSSION PROMPT: "What immediate containment measures? How assess full dependency tree exposure?"
INJECT 2: Seller Portal Authentication Failure (Day 1 - 04:00 PM)
Situation:
- Seller operations metrics:
- 89% password reset failure rate
- JWT validation errors spiking in API gateways
- Forensic analysis reveals:
node-forge
dependency compromised in CI/CD pipeline- Malicious code altering bcrypt hash rounds from 12 → 5
Facilitator Notes:
- Evaluate understanding of cryptographic downgrade attacks
- Note discussions about secret rotation procedures
DISCUSSION PROMPT: "How would you restore authentication integrity? What credential lifecycle changes are needed?"
INJECT 3: Inventory Data Manipulation (Day 1 - 06:00 PM)
Situation:
- Seller reports include:
- 12,784 listings deleted from fashion category
- GPU inventory set to negative values (-9,999 stock)
- Database audit logs show:
- Batch updates via service account
svc_inventory_worker
- SQL injection patterns targeting price calculation functions
- Batch updates via service account
Facilitator Notes:
- Assess database rollback capabilities
- Note discussions about immutable audit trails
DISCUSSION PROMPT: "What data integrity verification steps? How prevent future mass mutation attacks?"
INJECT 4: Secondary Vulnerability Exposure (Day 1 - 08:00 PM)
Situation:
- SAST tools flag:
[email protected]
with CVE-2024-32876 (CVSS 10.0)- Prototype pollution enabling XSS → RCE chain
- Attack pattern analysis reveals:
- Malicious objects injected via compromised API responses
- Privilege escalation to
cluster-admin
in Kubernetes
Facilitator Notes:
- Highlight cloud-native attack surfaces
- Note discussions about egress filtering strategies
DISCUSSION PROMPT: "What runtime protection measures? How validate Kubernetes RBAC configuration?"
INJECT 5: Fraudulent Product Listings (Day 1 - 09:00 PM)
Situation:
- Customer experience reports:
- 14,792 "$0.01 Special" listings across categories
- Checkout system allowing negative quantity orders
- Financial systems show:
- $2.8M in fake orders placed within 47 minutes
- Payment gateway callback spoofing detected
Facilitator Notes:
- Evaluate fraud detection mechanisms
- Note discussions about inventory freeze procedures
DISCUSSION PROMPT: "What immediate commerce safeguards? How communicate with payment processors?"
INJECT 6: Viral Traffic Surge (Day 1 - 10:00 PM)
Situation:
- Infrastructure metrics:
- 14M concurrent users (8,400% normal load)
- Auto-scaling limited by account EC2 vCPU quotas
- Redis cluster failure cascading to order service
- Social media analysis shows:
- Coordinated campaign using 228k bot accounts
- Trending hashtag #[WithPCI.com Company Name]Apocalypse
Facilitator Notes:
- Assess cloud incident response playbooks
- Note discussions about graceful degradation strategies
DISCUSSION PROMPT: "What availability vs. security tradeoffs exist? How implement emergency rate limiting?"
INJECT 7: Global Team Coordination Challenge (Day 2 - 03:00 AM)
Situation:
- Beijing development team status:
- 0/73 engineers available (Qingming Festival holiday)
- Great Firewall blocking access to Western collaboration tools
- Production hotfix requirements:
- Mandarin-only documentation for critical systems
- PGP key rotation dependency on unavailable team members
Facilitator Notes:
- Evaluate business continuity planning
- Note discussions about geopolitical risk factors
DISCUSSION PROMPT: "What contingency plans exist for regional outages? How maintain deployability during crises?"
INJECT 8: Full System Outage (Day 1 - 11:00 PM)
Situation:
- Infrastructure collapse metrics:
- 100% API error rate for 83 minutes
- Database replication lag exceeding 48 hours
- All backups contain vulnerable dependencies
- Executive pressure includes:
- Threat of regulatory action from FTC
- 14% stock price decline during trading hours
Facilitator Notes:
- Highlight disaster recovery decision-making
- Note discussions about safe deployment practices
DISCUSSION PROMPT: "What risks exist in restoring compromised backups? How validate patch effectiveness pre-deployment?"
INJECT 9: Patch Development Dilemma (Day 2 - 01:00 AM)
Situation:
- Engineering status report:
- React library replaced with
[email protected]
- Lodash upgraded to
4.17.21-security.0
- 19/142 microservices failing integration tests
- React library replaced with
- Security team identifies:
- New prototype pollution vectors in patched code
- Compatibility issues with legacy .NET inventory service
Facilitator Notes:
- Assess CI/CD pipeline security controls
- Note discussions about canary deployment strategies
DISCUSSION PROMPT: "What verification steps ensure patch completeness? How balance velocity vs. stability?"
INJECT 10: Recovery Validation (Day 3 - 08:00 AM)
Situation:
- Post-restoration metrics:
- 92% service availability restored
- 14 residual vulnerabilities in monitoring stack
- 3.2TB of corrupted order data requiring manual repair
- Ongoing challenges:
- Chinese New Year delaying full team mobilization
- SEC subpoena for incident timeline documentation
Facilitator Notes:
- Focus on compliance reporting requirements
- Note discussions about technical debt repayment
DISCUSSION PROMPT: "What metrics define full recovery? How institutionalize supply chain security improvements?"
Exercise Debrief
Technical Focus Areas:
- Third-Party Dependency Management
- Cloud-Native Incident Response
- Global Team Coordination Protocols
- Fraud Detection Automation
- Immutable Infrastructure Patterns
After-Action Deliverables:
- Software Bill of Materials implementation roadmap
- Geopolitical risk assessment framework
- Automated dependency CVE triage system design
- Cross-regional incident commander training plan
Next Steps:
- Implement Sigstore for artifact signing
- Establish 24/7 follow-the-sun response teams
- Conduct quarterly supply chain attack simulations
Your perspective on this PCI DSS requirement matters! Share your implementation experiences, challenges, or questions below. Your insights help other organizations improve their compliance journey and build a stronger security community.Comment Policy